MOSCOW, December 27 – RIA Novosti, Vadim Saranov. Missiles began to fly into Saudi Arabia frequently. Recently, the UN Security Council condemned the attack by the Yemeni Houthis on Riyadh. The target of the attack was the royal palace of Al-Yamamah, but nothing happened. The missile was either shot down or deviated from its course. Against this background, Saudi Arabia intends to significantly strengthen its missile defense. The main candidates for the role of an “umbrella” are the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system and the Russian S-400 Triumph air defense system. Read about the advantages and disadvantages of competitors in the RIA Novosti material.
S-400 hits further, THAAD hits higher
Objectively, THAAD and the S-400 Triumph air defense system are conditional competitors. "Triumph" is primarily designed to destroy aerodynamic targets: aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles. THAAD, on the other hand, is a system originally designed to combat short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. "American" is capable of destroying targets at altitudes that are prohibitive for conventional air defense systems - 150 kilometers, and according to some reports, even 200 kilometers. The latest anti-aircraft missile 40N6E of the Russian Triumph does not work above 30 kilometers. However, according to experts, the destruction altitude indicator, especially when it comes to combating operational-tactical missiles, is not critical.
“In theater missile defense, targets are destroyed on downward trajectories, and not in space,” Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, former deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force for the unified air defense system of the CIS countries, told RIA Novosti. “In the late 1980s, in missile defense "In the capital, it was planned to use two S-300V2 regiments. At the Kapustin Yar training ground, they created a model of the defense of Moscow with the same geometric dimensions and launched targets from the stratosphere. All of them were destroyed at a distance of 120 kilometers."
By the way, the main danger to Saudi Arabia today is precisely the R-17 Scud operational-tactical missiles and the Qahir and Zelzal tactical missiles, created on the basis of the Soviet Luna-M complex.
© AP Photo/U.S. Force Korea
© AP Photo/U.S. Force Korea
Another key difference between the American and Russian complexes is the principle of operation. If the Triumph hits targets with fragments after detonating the missile warhead near the target, then the THAAD, deprived of the warhead, hits the missile directly with a kinetic block. Meanwhile, despite the apparent complexity of this solution, the Americans managed to achieve good results during the tests - the probability of destroying a target with one anti-missile missile is 0.9, if THAAD backs up a simpler complex, this figure will be 0.96.
The main advantage of Triumph when used as an anti-missile system is its higher range. For the 40N6E missile it is up to 400 kilometers, while for THAAD it is 200 kilometers. Unlike the S-400, which can fire 360 degrees, the THAAD, when deployed, has a field of fire of 90 degrees horizontally and 60 degrees vertically. But at the same time, the “American” has better vision - the detection range of its AN/TPY-2 radar is 1000 kilometers versus 600 kilometers for the “Triumph”.
Combine incompatible
As you can see, Saudi Arabia intends to build its missile defense on two completely different systems. This approach may seem somewhat strange, because when using them, serious compatibility problems may arise. However, according to experts, this is a completely solvable issue.
“These two systems cannot be controlled in an automated mode from a single command post,” military expert Mikhail Khodarenok told RIA Novosti. “They have completely different mathematics, completely different logic. But this does not exclude the possibility of their combat use separately. They can be deployed in different localities or even within the framework of the defense of one object, if their tasks are divided into heights and sectors. They can simply complement each other perfectly, being in the same group."
Saudi Arabia's desire to acquire both Russian and American systems may be dictated by other considerations. After Operation Desert Storm, during which French anti-aircraft missile systems in service with Iraqi air defense suddenly became inoperable, potential buyers began to be more cautious about purchasing weapons manufactured in the West.
“There may be some hidden bugs in American weapons,” says Mikhail Khodarenok. “For example, an F-16 of the Jordanian Air Force cannot shoot down an F-16 of the Israeli Air Force. That is, if American weapons are used against Saudi Arabia, only the S-400 will be able to hit it.” "It can also work for conventional aerodynamic purposes. It is possible that this is the only reason they are buying the Russian system."
The most important difference between THAAD and Triumph is the price. The cost of one THAAD battery, which consists of six launchers for eight interceptor missiles each, is about $2.3 billion. The innovative AN/TPY-2 radar costs another 574 million. The cost of an S-400 battalion with eight launchers of four missiles each is about $500 million. The Russian complex costs almost six times less, while the advantages of THAAD, at least for now, are not obvious.
The U.S. Army deployed one of its seven terminal high altitude interception missile (THAAD) batteries to Romania. This deployment coincides with the closure of the Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense system also located in Romania for a planned upgrade.
Installation of THAAD missile defense battery equipment began on May 17, 2019 near the location of the Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense system. The US Army and the US Department of Defense independently first posted at least one photo of the installation being prepared for combat duty, and then quickly deleted it. Some websites have saved this photo.
The deployment of the THAAD missile defense system is a controversial issue. This system, in theory, has the same capabilities as the Aegis Ashore missile defense systems and helps close the gap created during the temporary suspension of the Aegis complex.
However, the installation of THAAD batteries causes a hostile reaction from the Russian leadership, as was the case with the Aegis Ashore ground-based system. Russia “does not understand what tasks the Aegis Ashore system will perform in the anti-missile field,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said at the end of April 2019.
The Pentagon and NATO have repeatedly tried to explain the reasons for the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. “At NATO's request, the Secretary of Defense will deploy a U.S. Army high-altitude terminal intercept missile defense system to Romania this summer in support of NATO's missile defense system,” a U.S. European Command spokesman said in early April 2019.
“The THAAD missile defense system from the 69th Artillery Air Defense Brigade, 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command will be integrated into the existing missile defense architecture for a limited period of time this summer, when planned maintenance and modernization of the Romanian ground-based missile defense system takes place "Aegis Ashore"
As of early 2019, the US Army had received approximately 200 missiles for its seven THAAD batteries and approximately 40 launchers. The US Missile Defense Agency on its website calls THAAD "a ground-based element capable of shooting down ballistic missiles both in the atmosphere and beyond."
US ground forces have THAAD missile defense batteries on the island of Guam, as well as in South Korea. In March 2019, the US Army deployed one THAAD battery to Israel.
Context
Uncle Sam's Hidden Intentions
People's Daily 08/02/2016Russia will wait: China will tell the US everything itself
Ming Bao 04/05/2017TNI: US anti-missile system is heading to Europe
The National Interest 04/16/2019 Aegis Ashore is a ground-based version of the US Navy SM-3 missile defense system. The US Missile Defense Agency, through NATO, operates Aegis Ashore ground-based systems in Poland and Romania. These installations help protect Europe and the United States from limited missile attacks from Middle Eastern powers such as Iran.However, the United States' missile defense system has been a source of resentment in Russia for decades. Moscow views U.S. missile defense systems as a threat to the global balance of power because they could theoretically render Russian nuclear-tipped missiles ineffective. In fact, most US missile defense systems lack the speed, range and accuracy to intercept ICBMs.
Only US ground-based mid-range missile defense systems in Alaska and California, both designed to intercept North Korean missiles, have demonstrated the ability to defeat some intercontinental ballistic missiles in test tests.
Many Russians mistakenly believe that ground-based Aegis Ashore systems can be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and therefore could be used in a surprise first strike. Aegis Ashore missile defenses "are the cause of a specific Russian fear," said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Monterey-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies.
According to him, many Russians believe that the United States is secretly planning to equip its anti-missile installations in Poland and Romania with nuclear warheads, thus turning them into what Lewis calls a “covert” strike force whose true purpose is to launch a nuclear surprise attack. a strike on Moscow in order to “decapitate” the Russian leadership.
"It's crazy, but they're 100 percent sure of it," Lewis said, referring to the Russians.
NATO emphasizes that neither Aegis Ashore nor THAAD pose a threat to Russia. “The THAAD battery will be under the operational control of NATO and under the full political control of the North Atlantic Council,” the alliance statement emphasized. “It will be in combat condition only until the Aegis Ashore complex returns to its place in Romania.” The upgrades and deployment are expected to continue for several weeks.”
“In accordance with NATO's missile defense system, the operation of THAAD batteries will be directed against potential threats arising outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The Aegis Ashore complexes deployed in Romania are purely defensive systems.”
David Ax is the defense editor of National Interest magazine. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War is Boring, and Machete Squad.
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, formerly called Theater High Altitude Area Defense) mobile ground-based anti-missile system is designed for high-altitude, trans-atmospheric interception of medium-range missiles when creating a zoned missile defense system in a theater of military operations (TVD).
The general contractor is Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
The plan for creating a theater missile defense system provided for the following stages of work:
At the first stage (1993-1995), the main efforts were focused on completing the modernization and testing the Patriot air defense system. This complex is capable of hitting ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 40 km and at altitudes of about 20 km. Further improvement of the Patriot PAC-3 complexes is associated with the use of Erint anti-missile missiles, which have high accuracy. To protect Marine Corps units from attacks from tactical missiles, it was planned to complete the modernization of the Improved Hawk air defense system with the new AN/TPS-59 radar. Covering the coastal airborne forces from missile attacks is entrusted to the modernized Aegis ship-based air defense systems using the Standard-2 missile defense system.
In addition, the combat control system was modernized, which had limited capabilities for detecting, processing and transmitting data on the launch of ballistic missiles and calculating their flight trajectory. To this end, the tactical information processing and communication system was improved so that it could use data from the Imeus space detection system. The information received from it makes it possible to more accurately calculate the launch point, flight path, expected impact points of ballistic missiles and transmit the necessary information to the radar of anti-missile systems. Work was carried out to modernize the ship's SPY-1 radar, which should provide detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, as well as assets included in the Air Force (Awaks and Jistar control systems).
At the second stage (1996-1999), the main efforts were aimed at developing and testing the THAAD missile defense system and creating a zone defense that would minimize damage in the event of an enemy strike with ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear, chemical or biological munitions. The THAAD mobile missile defense system is designed to defeat ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 200 km and altitudes of up to 150 km. With its help, the first line of zonal missile defense will be created. The characteristics of the THAAD complex allow it to sequentially fire at one ballistic missile with two anti-missiles according to the “launch-assess-launch” principle, that is, the second anti-missile will be launched if the first one does not hit the target. In the event of a miss of the second anti-missile missile, the Patriot air defense system is put into operation, which will receive target designations from the GBR radar about the broken ballistic missile. According to the calculations of American experts, the probability of hitting a missile with such a two-echelon missile defense system will be more than 0.96. Work is underway to study the possibility of deploying THAAD interceptor missiles on ships to combat advanced ballistic missiles. In addition, the Diamond Eyes space system should be deployed to detect launches and track ballistic missiles.
Compound
The THAAD anti-missile (see diagram) consists of a warhead and an engine. The only (separable) stage is the solid propellant starting motor. The missile is equipped with a thrust vector control system and gas-dynamic spoilers in the nose. Interceptors begin to work soon after launch and provide control during movement. Thus, the flight of the rocket at the launch and middle sections of the trajectory is controlled using the rotating nozzle of the sustainer solid propellant engine. The characteristics of this engine ensure that the missile accelerates to a speed of about 2.5 km/s, making it possible to implement the concept of “re-firing” a ballistic target. The tail of the rocket is a flexible, self-regulating and adaptable conical stabilizer to flight conditions, consisting of movable aerodynamic segment planes that rest on special gas bags. This design solution enhances the stabilizing effect when aerodynamic forces act on the rocket.
The intermediate compartment connecting the launch accelerator with the warhead contains a pyrotechnic composition, which, when exploding, separates the launch accelerator from the warhead.
The missile's warhead is a highly maneuverable direct-hit interceptor, the Kill Vehicle. This part of the missile is a technically complex device that searches for, locks on and then destroys a target using only high-speed kinetic energy. A special fairing covers the interceptor during the atmospheric portion of the flight. This is necessary to reduce aerodynamic drag and protect the homing head window from aerodynamic heating. One of the main features of the interceptor is a gyro-stabilized multispectral infrared homing head (IR-GOS) with a sapphire window, made on the basis of indium antimonide (operating range 3-5 μm). In addition to the IR seeker, the interceptor is equipped with a command-inertial control system, a computer, a power supply, as well as a DACS (Divert Attitude Control System) maneuvering and orientation propulsion system, which ensures precise maneuvering of the missile along the trajectory.
Each division includes:
Radar for detecting and tracking ballistic targets GBR(Ground Based Radar),
control center BM/C41,
launchers (4 pieces),
anti-missiles "THAAD" (60 pieces).
The BM/C41 control center is mounted on a multi-purpose vehicle chassis and can function as a tactical command post for a division T.O.S.(Tactical Operation Station) and launcher fire control point LCS(Launcher Control Station). In an LCS configuration, the control center provides information exchange with other LCSs and transfers information to the TOS. Each battery has several BM/C41 control points. Their interchangeability ensures multiple redundancy of the fire control system, which increases the combat stability of the complex as a whole.
The GBR multifunctional radar solves the problems of detecting, tracking, identifying and classifying targets, as well as guiding anti-missile missiles to the target in the initial part of the trajectory. The GBR radar uses an active phased array antenna in the X band with an antenna area of about 10-15 m2 and a number of elements of about 24,000.
When developing the THAAD anti-aircraft missile system, special attention is paid to the possibility of its rapid redeployment and deployment. To significantly reduce the weight of the equipment, advanced technology and microelectronics were used in its production. So, if the redeployment of two divisions of the Patriot air defense system to Saudi Arabia during the war in the Persian Gulf required 73 sorties of the C-5A aircraft, 123 sorties of the C-141 aircraft, 14 civilian airliners and 23 sea vessels, then the transfer of two divisions of the THAAD air defense system will require only 50 sorties of the C-141 aircraft.
Performance characteristics
Testing and operation
Testing of the complex began on April 21, 1995 at the White Sands training ground and continued with varying success until 1999. Only the ninth launch, on March 29, 1999, demonstrated the functionality of the complex as a whole. During this flight, despite the failure of the interceptor's spatial orientation system at 23 seconds of flight and the cessation of receiving telemetric information at 58 seconds, the interceptor passed in close proximity to the Hera target missile.
During the tenth test launch on June 10, 1999, a target simulating an SCAD missile was successfully intercepted for the first time, and the technical feasibility of such an interception was confirmed.
On August 2, 1999, during the eleventh test, a target simulating the separating warhead of a SKUD-type ballistic missile was intercepted in the upper atmosphere.
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D To overcome the risks that Europe faces following the emergence of new regional conflicts, a common defense policy and common efforts in the field of defense technologies are required. A separate area in this regard is reliable air defense (air defense) with such an important element as the missile defense system (ABM).
Ensuring European security - analysis of the situation and threats
Crisis processes and new air threats initiated a discussion in the West regarding improving the air defense of Europe.
On the one hand, it is believed that the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles ( Tactical Ballistic Missiles, TBM) from so-called “rogue states” such as North Korea, Iran and Syria, lead to potential regional conflict situations that threaten the Old World.
On the other hand, Western experts have noted a clear increase in the potential for conflict with Russia in recent years. The emergence of the latter was facilitated by the missile defense system created by the United States in Europe and the deployment of corresponding facilities in Poland (Redzikowo) and Romania (Deveselu).
Under these conditions, Russia sees a threat to the reduction in the operational value of its strategic weapons systems and, as a result, is carrying out further modernization of offensive weapons. In turn, Moscow’s policy in Ukraine, the Arctic and the Baltic Sea region is recognized by the military-political leadership of NATO countries as aggressive and causing concern.
Existing tools for localizing possible risks in the Euro-Atlantic region were reviewed at the practical conference “Aerospace Forces and Facilities” that opened on October 11, 2017 in Essen (Germany). Joint Air and Space Power Conference). As one of the participants stated, two of these tools are air power ( Air Power) and improved air defense ( Advanced Air Defense, in fact, missile defense) are understood as “deterrents.”
Their importance for reliable defense against tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) in Europe is growing with the degree of threat from new means of attack. An understanding is emerging that only a unified system, including early warning and destruction subsystems, is capable of providing adequate protection against TBRs and their warheads.
At the same time, great risks are associated with the threat of tactical and strategic aerodynamic offensive weapons (cruise missiles, missiles). Experts consider the current assessment of the development and proliferation of such weapons systems to be insufficient. As a result, the threat posed by the Kyrgyz Republic remains largely hidden from the public.
Air defense of ground forces - missing potential
According to Western military experts, the absence or insufficient understanding by the leadership of most NATO countries of the need to additionally take into account the threat from cruise missiles leads to an alarming air defense deficit. This especially affects short and medium ranges and altitudes.
This issue was discussed at the symposium “Use of airspace by ground forces - operational and technical aspects” ( Nutzung des Luftraums durch die Landstreitkräfte – operativ und technisch). The event took place in mid-November 2017 at the international helicopter training center of the Bundeswehr Air Force, Bückeburg.
Participants noted that the shortcomings of short-range and shorter-range air defense ( SHORAD/ VSHORAD, Short-Range/Very Short-Range Air Defense) have been taking place for several years. Modernization of ground-based air defense is considered a high priority project. In the medium term, preliminary research and initial development of a short-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) is estimated at 460 million euros. For a later phase of the project, an additional tranche of approximately two billion euros will be required. At the same time, it is not clear whether these funds will be sufficient and whether European industry will be able to use already developed laser technologies and additional sensor components in the interests of this air defense system.
According to publications, the main favorites for adoption as air defense systems for covering ground forces may be the IRIS-T SL/SLS anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) or the modernized NASAMS II air defense system. The first is a product of the German company Deal Defense ( Diehl Defense), the second is the joint development of the Norwegian Konsberg ( Norwegian Kongsberg) and the American "Raytheon" ( Raytheon).
The IRIS-T SL/SLS complex, as part of the overall IRIS-T SLM air defense system, can be adapted for ground launch similar to the configuration purchased by Sweden on the Bv206 / BvS10 vehicle. For IRIS-T SL ( Surface Launched) we are talking about an extended range version of the IRIS-T guided missile. The system is designed for use at altitudes up to five km and a range of 10 km. The NASAMS II air defense system is already used by the armed forces of Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the USA.
Analysts note the advantages of each system. There is also an opinion that it is too large to use the IRIS-T SL air defense system as a replacement for the Ozelot or Stinger systems. As a result, no decisions have been announced yet.
Missile defense system - difficulties and solutions
According to NATO analysts, the proliferation of tactical ballistic missile technologies has reached a global scale. Some states in Central and Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East, will already have more than 2,200 TBRs with different ranges and types of warheads at the beginning of the next decade. Of these, about 600 TBRs will have a range of more than 2,500 km and could threaten Central Europe. In particular, North Korea's work on systems with a range of more than 9,000 km confirms this trend.
The current situation of global proliferation of TBRs is aggravated by the fact that the air defense/missile defense systems currently in service are experiencing great difficulty in defeating them. At the same time, we are also talking about submunitions, which are separated from the carrier at high altitudes and enter the dense layers of the atmosphere as a combat warhead.
In NATO documents, tactical ballistic missiles approaching the target at supersonic speeds (with a high MAX number) are called extremely critical. Because they are extremely difficult to defeat due to increased range, improved accuracy, sharply reduced radiation rates and relatively small affected areas.
Just as the interception of TBRs and their warheads in the exosphere (altitude 800 - 3000 km) represents a technological challenge, their defeat in the lower layers of the atmosphere remains problematic. Firstly, high accuracy is required to destroy a single TBR: either the electronic equipment of the missile or the warhead. Secondly, by this moment the target of interception may be warheads (submunitions) that have already been separated and fallen into the lower layers.
In addition, experts note that the Western missile defense system is experiencing methodological problems. There are still no uniform criteria to guarantee the safe identification of the position of a warhead in a TBR, the discrimination of an approaching warhead from a decoy, and the classification of the type of combat warhead.
In addition, hitting a carrier in the interception zone should ensure, to the extent possible, that collateral damage on the ground from its submunitions is prevented. In this regard, chemical and biological (bacteriological) HS have long been considered particularly dangerous. Since the destruction of their carrier (or the ammunition itself) at altitudes of more than 20 km leads to a significant radius of destruction on the ground.
Sea-based missile defense
Currently, the NATO missile defense system has the Patriot complex (Patriot PAC-3). This complex and others like it are designated final phase systems.
According to the “impact destruction” technology used ( Hit-to-kill HTK) requires a direct hit on an approaching target. At the same time, fire control of the PAC-3 is performed from the ground. NATO experts are aware of the Patriot's insufficient capabilities to engage long-range ballistic missiles in the lower atmosphere, but view it as a significant potential for European missile defense in its current state.
Naval missile defense systems, in comparison with traditional ground-based systems, have a significantly larger guaranteed control area, thanks to more advanced technical capabilities. For this reason, Germany and the Netherlands plan to compensate for emerging gaps in their national missile defense systems by adapting the capabilities of their shipborne detection systems. In particular, the Dutch division of the international industrial group Thales ( Thales Netherlands) is preparing the SMART-L MM/N radar system ( Multi-Mission/Naval), based on gallium nitride technology.
As a variant of a typical scenario for protection against TBR, the use of the F124 frigate (Saxony type) of the Bundeswehr Navy is considered as a rational platform integrated into a combined arms operation. The ship is used to receive, combine (merge) and exchange detection equipment data (forming a so-called sensor network) with other ships and aircraft of the German Navy and allied forces.
Prerequisites for future improvements in maritime defense over the long term include improvements in the performance of computer processing of early warning data and real-time radar. The main idea for this is proposed by the American concept of coordinated interaction ( Coordinated Engagement Concept, CEC).
According to the concept, target data from different sensor platforms is used for early warning purposes. Such platforms can be:
- sea-based systems such as AEGIS SPY-1 (in the future SPY-6);
- airborne equipment E-2D AHE Advanced Hawkeye or JTIDS ( integrated tactical information distribution system);
- a ground-based missile defense system integrated with them into a single network on geographically distributed platforms.
The received and processed data is used to provide all consumers with a unified picture of the air situation.
According to experts, from today's point of view, early detection and destruction of TBRs and their warheads containing various submunitions is possible only with the help of CEC or a similar early warning system.
Sea-based missile defense systems, having larger coverage areas compared to ground-based systems like the PAC-3, can make it possible to abandon ground-based early warning radars during combat operations. For example, if phased ship radars are located close to the positions of enemy TBRs in the coastal area. They detect a threat much earlier and can hit it during the take-off phase with their ship-based anti-missile defenses.
Comparative capabilities of missile defense systems
According to publications, conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2012. In the West, research in the interests of missile defense has yielded positive results regarding the possibility of destroying TBRs in the lower layers of the atmosphere. The Patriot PAC-3 complex and a similar MEADS/TLVS tactical air defense system demonstrated a direct hit probability of more than 70 percent, and the probability of destroying a target with a double launch of PAC-3 anti-missile missiles was almost 90 percent.
It is noted that similar work was carried out in France and Italy. The universally based SAMP/T air defense system and the final phase system based on the ASTER30 showed a predicted direct hit probability of 65 to 75 percent.
It has also been established that the maximum possible probability of a direct hit from these defense systems depends on the flight path and speed of the approaching TBR. Firstly, the vulnerability of a missile increases after it is immersed in denser layers of the atmosphere. Secondly, the angle of such an entry becomes flatter as the missile launch range increases.
It is considered confirmed that the speed of long-range TBRs, Russian ICBMs of the RS-12M1/2 Torol-M type, similar North Korean, Iranian, Pakistani and Chinese designs, for example: Taepo-Dong 2, Shahab 3 or BM25 Musudan, Agni III and JL -2 (CSS-NX-5) – slows down after entering the atmosphere. For TBRs with a range of more than 2000 km, similar features are expected already at an altitude of about 30 km.
THAAD missile defense system
The defensive complex for transatmospheric interception (exosphere level) is considered to be “Ted” ( Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD). The height of its effective use is more than 20 km. The complex uses kinetic HF ( Kinetic Kill Vehicles, KKV) with high kinetic energy (more than 200 MJ). The missile defense system, based on THAAD or Patriot PAC-3 and MEADS/TLVS systems, uses the same traditional HTK technology. But the size of the covered area varies greatly.
The long-range interception missile defense system adopted by the US Armed Forces ( Upper Layer-System) THAAD must ensure the destruction of tactical ballistic missiles approaching at various angles at high altitudes ( Upper Keep-out Altitude). The target detection range of its radar with a fixed antenna and electronic beam deflection can exceed 450 km. At the same time, the required early detection and identification of TBRs is supposedly ensured, as well as the distinction between combat and false warheads, which was previously unattainable using previous generation systems.
According to calculations based on the example of Germany, if THAAD were used in Europe, in comparison with PAC-3 and MEADS/TLVS, many times fewer launch positions would be required to cover the entire territory of the country.
Resolving technological risks remains questionable
Despite certain achievements in the field of missile defense, Western experts state that the technological assessment of the capabilities of protection against long-range missiles is extremely difficult.
Critical indicators of a future missile defense system will be range, accuracy and reaction time. At the same time, the modern missile defense system is based, for the most part, on developments from the early 1960s. However, there is still no system that guarantees the extremely high accuracy requirements for full protection against the entire modern range of TBRs.
Approaches to ground-based missile defense systems currently being developed ( Ground Based Interceptor) and THAAD in the USA, Arrow 2 in Israel and S-300 in Russia are similar.
It is also noted that the ability to recognize targets with low radar reflections declared for the THAAD transatmospheric interception system remains technologically controversial ( RadarCrossSectionsR.C.S.). Because it is very difficult to distinguish combat warheads from neighboring false warheads.
In addition to the above, missile defense systems like the PAC-3, which are used against a wide range of threats and, due to their mobility and autonomy, are especially suitable for participation in joint military operations, are dominated by the problem of target engagement altitude. The question is how can toxic substances in warheads be made harmless before they reach the surface of the territory of a defended, neutral or allied state in concentrated form.
In this regard, experts are considering systems for interception in the so-called acceleration (lifting) phase. Possible solutions include either the use of directed kinetic energy or the use of laser weapons. In any case, the principle is to eliminate the threat of TBP already above enemy territory. A long-term option is to destroy the missile during ascent using air-launched high-energy laser systems. Thus, the risk of residual effects from submunitions is limited to enemy territory.
Bymaterialsmagazine"Europäische Sicherheit &Technik".
The US military conducted a successful test of the THAAD missile defense system in Alaska, during which a medium-range ballistic missile was hit.
The Pentagon successfully tests the THAAD missile
Head of the US Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Samuel Greaves stated that these tests showed the capabilities of the THAAD system and its ability to intercept and destroy modern ballistic missiles.
In addition, the Pentagon said that these tests should not be linked to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which is quite significant given that the United States recently delivered such systems to this region - formally to combat the "threat" posed by North Korea's missile program , but in fact – for the development of its global missile defense system.
It is also interesting that the distance between Alaska and Hawaii is 5 thousand kilometers, and this suggests - to use the terminology - that the THAAD system is capable of fighting not only medium-range ballistic missiles of the DPRK, but also missiles that are in service with Russia and China.
Expert at the Center for Strategies and Technologies Sergey Denisentsev in conversation with FBA "Economy Today" noted that the presence of such missiles on the territory of the Korean Peninsula, in any case, will seriously change the strategic balance of forces in this important region of the world.
In the coming years, the presence of THAAD will become a trump card in the hands of the Americans
Naturally, the basing zone of domestic strategic nuclear submarines from the Pacific Fleet is located much further to the north, and the routes of Russian ground-based ballistic missiles run through the North Pole, but still this fact must be taken into account, as well as the fact that the real characteristics of THAAD are higher than those originally stated .
“The fact is that any missile defense system changes the strategic balance of forces, and in this THAAD is also a threat and a destabilizing factor, and, if we are talking about South Korea, not so much for Russia as for China,” states Denisentsev.
It may be recalled here that the entire strategy of the PRC, including the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, is aimed at ensuring an acceptable level of operational freedom for its strategic forces, and in this regard, the deployment of THAAD in South Korea will be another important factor, which Beijing will have to constantly reckon with.
“As for the THAAD system itself in the context of its comparison with Russian analogues, our modern complexes such as S-300 and S-400 have similar functions, but you need to understand that these are anti-aircraft, not anti-missile systems. In practice, this is far from the same thing the same, since the fight against missiles is still a separate topic,” concludes Denisentsev.
The USA realized the advantages of the nineties
It should be recalled here that during the Cold War, missile defense problems were regulated by the ABM Treaty, which was signed by Moscow and Washington in 1972 and was in force until 2002, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from this agreement.
At that time, our countries were in different situations - Russia was just beginning to move away from the nineties, and the United States began an active phase of developing almost ready-made anti-missile systems, as a result of which it should not be surprising that the Americans took the lead here.
“The THAAD system began to be developed in the United States much earlier than our analogues, so the level of technical readiness of this military weapon in the context of countering ballistic missiles is still higher than that of its Russian analogues,” Denisentsev sums up.
In this regard, the first Russian missile defense system, where the fight against ballistic missiles will not be optional, but one of the main tasks, will be the promising S-500 complex.
This system will apply the principle of a separate solution for the destruction of ballistic and aerodynamic targets, and its main combat mission will be the fight against combat equipment of ballistic missiles, i.e. directly with nuclear warheads.
Any missile defense system changes the strategic balance of power in the world
Interestingly, this circumstance allowed the American publication National Interest call the S-500 a direct analogue of THAAD, although, in fact, the range of tasks of the Russian system is much wider.
“The Russian S-500 system is not ready yet, since the development of such a complex is a very complex process, but the Americans with THAAD already have everything working. This is not surprising, since they started working much earlier, attracted more forces and resources, and also conducted many tests before this event in the skies over Alaska,” states Denisentsev.
Thus, we can conclude that in the case of THAAD, the Americans realized their very serious advantage in time, although it must be understood that the presence of such a system will not change the strategic balance of power between Russia and the United States. At the same time, THAAD's presence in South Korea could have a significant impact on neighboring states.
“When we talk about Russia’s interests, several deployed THAAD systems will not change anything, but this, in turn, will become a factor for the United States to put pressure on other nuclear countries in the region. However, if at some point near the borders of Russia the United States puts many such systems, and they are supplemented with other components, including, for example, space-based missile defense systems, then all this will become a threat to our country,” Denisentsev concludes.
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