I have been asking myself for a long time about Pakistan's nuclear weapons. How did it get there? Have you ever thought? Did anyone counteract this (as the US is now countering Iran) and why little is heard about this, although Bin Laden did entrench himself in Pakistan at one time. I have always been interested in the question, why is India allowed, China is allowed, Pakistan is allowed, but Iran, for example, is not allowed? And then there’s the news today:

By developing tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan has practically entered the closed club of countries possessing such weapons, which now includes the United States, Russia, France and China. At the same time, Pakistan, like France, gives tactical nuclear weapons the functions that strategic nuclear weapons perform in Russia and the United States, American experts note. We are talking about the Nasr mobile short-range missile, the first tests of which took place in Pakistan in April 2011.

According to Pakistani open sources, it is designed to destroy objects with great precision at a distance of 60 kv from the launch site. Nasr refers to dual-use missiles capable of delivering both nuclear warheads and conventional warheads. In Pakistan, it is being created as a “quick reaction weapon for the purpose of nuclear deterrence against suddenly emerging threats from a potential enemy.”

According to available official data, the following countries currently possess nuclear weapons: (based on the year of the first nuclear test) USA (since 1945), Russia (originally the Soviet Union, 1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2012). Israel is also considered to have nuclear weapons.

How did the Muslim country Pakistan, which closely cooperates with terrorists, end up in this company? Let's try to find answers to these questions and study the course of history in more detail... -

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The presence of nuclear forces in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a fundamental moment in the development of world history. This is a completely logical and natural step for a country that, with a rather low standard of living of the population, brings to the fore the priorities of protecting its national sovereignty. The reasons for this programmed phenomenon lie in the very history of the emergence of Pakistan, its current position on the political map of the world. The fact is that the presence in British India, which organically included the modern territories of Pakistan, India and Ceylon, of the largest religious communities - Hindu and Muslim - should sooner or later lead to a political state when each of them would demand complete independence as in public administration, and even more so in representation in the international arena. After the 1857 uprising against the British, who defeated the rebels, the most authoritative leader of the Muslim population of the then unified country was Sayyid Ahmad Shah, who preached Western values ​​and advocated close political and economic ties with England.

The importance of British India for England was so great both strategically and even more so economically that the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, said: “If we lose India, the sun of the British Empire will set.” And in order to prevent all the consequences of such a division in the future, even then a policy of confrontation between religious communities began to be laid down - their internecine war will always distract attention from the foreign policy interests of industrialized countries. That is why, already in 1883, Ahmad Shah managed to implement the rule of separate voting for Muslims and Hindus, and in 1885 a university was founded where only Muslims were admitted. Moreover, it was at his instigation that in 1887 Muslims began to leave the Indian National Congress, which was formed in 1885. After the death of Ahamd Shah in Dhaka in 1906, the All-India Muslim League was formed, which declared its goal to create an exclusively independent Islamic state in India called Pakistan, which translates as “the land of the pure.” However, Mahatma Gandhi appeared on the political scene of British India, who, thanks to his religious tolerance, managed to become the recognized leader of virtually all political forces in the country. But at the same time, personalities such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, who wrote incendiary sermons to fellow believers, managed to almost completely persuade Muslims to create the state of Pakistan.

At the end of December 1930, at the congress of the Muslim League, M. Iqbal spoke in favor of a categorical separation from British India into a completely independent Islamic state. And in March 1940, the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, proclaimed its main goal - the creation of Pakistan. Interesting fact: the name Pakistan was suggested by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali, who lived in England and studied at Cambridge. As we see, the origins of the creation of the new state were educated and literate people who managed to lead millions of backward and unenlightened people. There is a lot to learn from British diplomacy, its politicians and education system. In order to constitutionally legitimize the independence of Muslims in the territorial regions of India, a declaration was adopted in Lahore in 1940, which spoke of “areas in which Muslims constitute a numerical majority. They should unite to constitute independent states in which the territorial units should have autonomy and sovereignty." Then the chronology of events went as follows. On August 15, 1947, at midnight, the independence of India was proclaimed, but already on August 14, the state of Pakistan appeared on the political map of the world. And immediately religious pogroms began, leading to the displacement of millions of refugees. The death toll, according to some sources, exceeded 300 thousand people. And in October 1947, hostilities began between two state formations over the territory of Kashmir, three-quarters of which are Muslim, but power belongs to the leaders of the Hindu community.

Until January 1, 1949, there were bloody battles; the territorial and, especially, religious problems were never resolved. Moreover, even today it does not seem appropriate to talk about a peaceful solution to all disputes between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India. Now it is difficult to even imagine all the consequences that may arise between the two countries in the future. The armed confrontation between the two countries will continue for quite a long time, reminiscent of the situation of the absence of any peace treaty between Israel and Palestine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other. That is why “nuclear potential has become the main force of deterrence and helped establish peace in the region,” said Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz. He further states that “in 2002, when India deployed a million-strong army on our borders, ... it was only the fact that Pakistan had nuclear weapons that forced the Indians to abandon plans for an invasion.”

Looking ahead, we note that a completely predictable conflict between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the parties. The war for Kashmir in the future is real, as is the sabotage activity on both sides, which has taken place, is taking place and will take place without time limits. The confrontation is so great that resolving all controversial issues peacefully is very problematic, and that is why such a tough factor as nuclear weapons appears on the scene. As numerous experts have noted, it is almost impossible to estimate the number and types of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal. Everything is surrounded by secrecy and suspicion.

In general, the history of the creation of atomic weapons by Pakistan is a very fascinating description of its effects. According to some experts, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, after the defeat by India in the war for the eastern provinces, on January 24, 1972, gathered leading nuclear physicists. According to American journalist Tim Weiner, Pakistan managed to create a smuggling network that allowed it to steal and buy technology for the production of atomic weapons. However, in reality things were somewhat different. First of all, we should note the participation of mainland China. It was so large that the participation of Saudi Arabia and Libya in this program was purely financial, especially in 1973 and 1974. True, some American journalists believe that the United States is also involved in Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. At least this weapon was created with their tacit consent. Skipping numerous details of the history of the formation of Pakistan's nuclear program, we note that countries such as Holland, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland played a role in the supply of equipment for the enrichment of nuclear ore and the creation of individual components. After Bhutto was overthrown as a result of a coup d'etat and then executed, the creation of nuclear weapons proceeded exclusively under the control of the ISI military intelligence.

Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb in 1998, literally two weeks after India conducted similar tests. Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared itself as a country with nuclear forces, the world community was presented with a fait accompli. This was only possible by the USA, USSR, mainland China and the United States of India, whose atomic component in their weapons is a completely independent structural unit. It is now known that it was Abdul Qadeer Khan who managed to create an atomic bomb for his country at his research laboratory in Kahuta in northern Pakistan. This center operated more than 1,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30–52 nuclear warheads. About two months ago, an investigation was launched in Pakistan against Abdul Qadir Khan, the country's top nuclear scientist. During the investigation, Khan admitted that he transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The CIA and the IAEA established that he created an entire network for trading nuclear secrets. In early February 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf granted Khan's request for clemency. At the same time, Musharraf said that he would not allow an independent investigation into Khan’s activities and would not open the country’s nuclear facilities to international inspectors. Nuclear explosive devices are believed to be based on a so-called implosion design, which allows the use of a solid core of highly enriched uranium at a cost of approximately 15–20 kilograms per warhead. Let us recall that the solution to the problem of converging spherical shock and detonation waves served as the theoretical basis for the “implosion” principle. It is implosion that makes it possible not only to form a critical mass much faster, but also to make do with a smaller mass of nuclear explosives. Experts explain the participation of mainland China in the creation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan by the following fact.

Seismic measurements of tests conducted on 28 and 30 May 1998 by Islamabad suggest that the results were at levels of 9–12 and 4–6 kilotons, respectively. Since similar designs were used during Chinese tests in the 1960s, it is concluded that Beijing assisted Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the main principle of the presence of Chinese nuclear specialists in the nuclear centers of Pakistan is that the armed clashes between mainland China and the United States of India took on such a local character, the expansion of which could be very costly for both countries. Since the conduct of military operations by Beijing simultaneously against island China and Delhi is a more than dangerous option (in this case, the US Navy will be involved), China’s strategic plan is quite natural, according to which it is planned to create and use Pakistan’s nuclear forces to divert the armed forces India from the border with mainland China and their relocation to the west, to the borders of Pakistan. Moreover, it is Islamabad’s presence of effective nuclear forces that will serve as the basis for strategic security for mainland China. Analyzing the qualitative component of Pakistan's atomic weapons, experts note that there is no accurate data on what type of uranium is used and in what quantity. For two decades, Pakistan has used the gas centrifuge method of uranium enrichment to produce fission material for its own nuclear weapons. Independent nuclear weapons experts estimate that Islamabad has between 24 and 48 nuclear warheads.
Islamabad, comparing itself with countries that have nuclear weapons, believes that it lags significantly behind them in the field of modernization. Therefore, he is dissatisfied with his first generation weapons and continues to develop other projects in the field of uranium enrichment.

It is believed that the Khushab reactor in Joharabad, in the Punjab region, can produce weapons-grade plutonium. The presence of lithium-6 allows “Pakistani” scientists to obtain tritium. The fact is that next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi there is a processing plant where tritium can be produced. Let us remind you: tritium is used in the thermonuclear reaction of boosting (strengthening) the primary assembly of a nuclear warhead.

A thermonuclear charge is a multi-stage explosive device, the power of the explosion is achieved due to sequential processes: the explosion of a plutonium charge, and then due to the created reaction temperature - the synthesis of tritium nuclei with the release of even more energy, which can be used to “ignite” the charge of the third stage. more power, etc. The power of an explosive device designed in this way can be arbitrarily large. The traditional method of producing tritium is its production in reactors by irradiating targets from the lithium-6 isotope with neutrons. During warhead storage, tritium losses due to natural decay are approximately 5.5% per year. As tritium decays, it turns into helium. Therefore, tritium undergoes periodic purification from helium.

All these efforts allow Pakistan not only to increase the power of its nuclear forces, but also to begin developing thermonuclear weapons. The acceleration of this process can be attributed to the fact that Pakistan's nuclear committee decided on an adequate response from India to its decision to create a comprehensive nuclear triad: air - land - sea. It was the strengthening of nuclear power that allowed Islamabad to begin its nuclear exports. Thus, in particular, Pakistan is ready to provide military assistance to Nigeria and turn this country into a nuclear power. According to the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, the proposal was made by General Muhammad Aziz Khan, head of the Pakistani Joint Committee of Staff, at a meeting with the Nigerian Minister of Defense in 2004. Khan said that the Pakistani military is developing an entire cooperation program that includes assistance to Nigeria in the nuclear field. It is not specified which weapons, materials or technologies can be transferred within the framework of this program.

At the end of January this year, a representative of the Nigerian government announced the preparation of a preliminary agreement with North Korea, under the terms of which Nigeria would receive North Korean missile technology. This report was subsequently denied in Pyongyang, and the spokesman for the Nigerian president said that no agreements had been signed yet. He added that Nigeria is not trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and plans to use missiles exclusively for “peacekeeping” purposes and to protect its own territory. To summarize, we note that Pakistan's scientific research in the field of nuclear weapons has already advanced to the point where it is able to develop thermonuclear weapons. As for Pakistan's nuclear forces, they have real effectiveness and in the event of an armed conflict with India, if a more than unfavorable situation arises in the defense capability of their country, they will be used to the fullest extent.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, simultaneously with the creation of nuclear weapons, planned to use them in various combat conditions and to destroy enemy targets at various distances. Taking into account the solution to these problems, Islamabad also developed various options for means of delivering nuclear warheads - from aircraft to ballistic missiles.

Among the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the F-16 aircraft manufactured in the United States should be considered. Although the Pakistani Air Force will be able to use French Mirage V or Chinese A-5 aircraft in this case. Twenty-eight F-16A (single-seat) and 12 F-16B (two-seat) were delivered between 1983 and 1987. At least eight of them are no longer in service.

In 1985, the US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, aimed at prohibiting Pakistan from creating an atomic bomb. Under this amendment, Pakistan could not receive economic and military assistance unless the US President could certify that Islamabad did not possess a nuclear device. This also applied to possible means of delivering nuclear weapons. However, although there was ample evidence indicating that nuclear weapons were being developed in Pakistan, Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. turned a blind eye to this mainly in order to intensify activities against the USSR in the Afghan conflict. After the war in Afghanistan ended, sanctions were finally imposed on Pakistan. This happened on October 6, 1990. In March 2005, George W. Bush agreed to the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. At the first stage, these deliveries included 24 F-16 aircraft.

It should also be noted that, according to Press trust of India, in March 2005, production of the joint Pakistani-Chinese fighter JF-17 officially began in Pakistan. At the aviation enterprise in the city of Kamra, where the aircraft will be produced, a solemn ceremony was held to mark this event. The country's President Pervez Musharraf took part in it.

With the help of Chinese specialists, the F-16 will be modernized for use as a carrier of nuclear weapons. First of all, they will be equipped with squadrons 9 and 11 at the Sargodha airbase, 160 km northwest of Lahore.

The F-16 has a range of more than 1,600 km and can be increased further by upgrading its fuel tanks. Given the weight and payload size limitations of the F-16, the bomb likely weighs approximately 1,000 kg, and it is most likely that the nuclear warhead is suspended in full operational readiness at one or even several Pakistani air bases.

Note that, in principle, assembled nuclear bombs or their components specifically for such aircraft can be stored in an ammunition depot near Sargodha.

Alternatively, nuclear weapons could be stored near the Afghan border. This option is also possible, but for specialists this information is a kind of distraction, because there are clear obligations of the Pakistani authorities to the United States about the non-deployment of nuclear components in the territories adjacent to Afghanistan.

Pakistan's nuclear delivery vehicle is the Ghauri missile, although other missiles in the Pakistani military could be upgraded to carry a nuclear warhead. Ghauri-1 was successfully tested on April 6, 1998, over a distance of 1,100 km, probably with a payload of up to 700 kg. Experts said the missile was launched near the town of Jhelum in northeastern Pakistan, 100 km southeast of Islamabad, and hit its intended target near Quetta in the southwest.

The Ghauri-2 two-stage ballistic missile was tested on April 14, 1999, three days after the Indian Agni-2 missile was tested. The launch was carried out from a mobile launcher at Dina, near Jhelum, and the rocket landed at Jiwani, near the southwest coast, after an eight-minute flight.

A third version of the Ghauri, with an unconfirmed range of 2500–3000 km, is in development, but was already tested on August 15, 2000.

There is information that there is also a Khataf-V Ghauri missile, the test of which was allegedly carried out in early June 2004. It is said to have a flight range of 1.5 thousand km and can deliver any charge weighing up to 800 kg. The location of the trial was not disclosed. It was as if Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf was present. This was the second test of such a missile in a week(1).

The choice of the name "Ghauri" (2) is very symbolic. The Muslim Sultan Mahammad Ghauri defeated the Hindu ruler Praitvi Chauhan in 1192. Moreover, "Praithvi" is the name that India gave to its short-range ballistic missile.

Using its political intrigue with Beijing against India, Islamabad managed to obtain not just M-11 missiles, but also documentation for their production and maintenance. Since 1992, 30 or more M-11 missiles have been delivered to Pakistan from China. Subsequently, Beijing's assistance also manifested itself in the construction of missile maintenance and storage facilities. Therefore, Pakistan can produce its own Tarmuk missile based on the M-11, which it has done quite successfully.

The war with India is a more than real factor, which is the highest priority of the entire economic and political life of Pakistan. This thought occupied and occupies the heads of the generals of Islamabad, Delhi and Beijing. That is why billions of dollars are spent on the production of already technically developed delivery vehicles and the same amount of money is spent on the creation of new missile systems. In particular, the Chinese M-9 Shaheen-1 (Eagle) missile, redesigned in Pakistan, has a flight range of 700 km and can carry a payload of 1000 kg. Pakistan conducted the initial flight test of the Shaheen from the coastal town of Sonmiani on April 15, 1999.

At the March 23 parade in 2000, Islamabad displayed the Shaheen-2, a two-stage medium-range missile, as well as a missile with a range of 2,500 km capable of carrying a 1,000-kg payload. The missile was transported on a mobile launcher with 16 wheels. It is possible that both missiles could carry nuclear warheads.

In November 2000, Pakistan decided to place its key nuclear institutions under the control of the National Nuclear Weapons Control Committee. The new government, installed in February 2000, set as its goal the creation of an effective nuclear command and control system.

The events of September 11, 2000 served as a reason to strengthen measures against the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Pakistan, as a loyal and more than devoted ally of the United States, immediately strengthened the security of storage facilities with nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

According to press reports, Pakistan's military moved nuclear weapons components to new secret sites within two days of September 11, 2000. General Pervez Musharraf took several active measures to organize the security of maintaining the country's nuclear arsenal. Thus, in particular, six new secret storage and storage facilities for nuclear weapons components were installed.

In early March 2004, Pakistan tested a medium-range ballistic missile that could easily hit any Indian city.

In a statement, the Pakistani Ministry of Defense said that the tests of the two-stage Shaheen-2 missile were successful. According to Reuters, the creation of Pakistani science and engineering can carry a nuclear warhead at a distance of up to 2,000 km(3). Pakistan said it considered the missile test sufficient to deter aggression and “prevent military pressure.”

India was warned about the tests in advance. Let us note that at the beginning of March 2004, India entered into an agreement with Israel to purchase the Falcon airborne radar station. The system can detect aircraft from several kilometers away and intercept radio transmissions over large parts of Pakistan, including the disputed state of Kashmir.

In the first ten days of October 2004, tests of Hatf-5 (Ghauri) medium-range ballistic missiles were carried out, during which all the conditional targets of the alleged enemy were successfully hit.

This rocket runs on liquid fuel and, as some agencies note, was developed based on Korean technology (4). This missile is capable of carrying a nuclear charge and covering a distance of up to 1,500 km.

In April 2006, it was reported that Islamabad had conducted new tests of the Hatf-6 medium-range ballistic missile with an increased range of up to 2,500 km. These tests, according to the Pakistani military, were successful. As noted in one of the messages, “the tests were carried out to confirm a number of additional technical parameters, in addition to those that were verified during the last launch, carried out in March 2005” (5).

conclusions

In Pakistan, the means of delivering nuclear weapons, unlike India, are limited to the air force and missiles, which continue to be improved with the help of China.

In its technical equipment, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has reached full parity with the United States of India and is already ahead of its neighbor in some types of delivery.

The expected evolution of the technical development of Pakistan's rocket industry allows us to conclude that intercontinental ballistic missiles will appear in its arsenal in the very near future.

A.M. Tronov, A.K. Lukoyanov«- Pakistan Nuclear Forces" -

Can Islamists Gain Access to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons? Islamabad could become the third largest country in the world in terms of volume after Russia and the United States. This conclusion was made by American analysts in a report prepared for the Carnegie Endowment. According to experts, such a prospect is realistic if Pakistan maintains its current production rate of up to 20 nuclear warheads per year.

Currently, Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal, according to the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI), is the sixth largest in the world after the Russian Federation, the USA, France, China and the UK.

According to the Financial Times, a senior Pakistani government official called for caution in the study's estimates.

These projections into the future are greatly exaggerated. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power, not an adventurer state, he told the publication.

Pakistan joined the club of nuclear powers in 1998. This happened a few weeks after India, its main regional rival, tested its nuclear weapons. Both countries refused to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Let us remind you that according to this Treaty, only five countries are allowed to have weapons of mass destruction: Russia, the USA, China, France and the UK.

How could Pakistan's nuclear push affect global security? Today, the answer to this question worries many.

In May 2015, the media reported that Saudi Arabia had decided to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. The reason is deals on Iran's nuclear program. It was then noted that over the past 30 years, Saudi Arabia has financed the Pakistani nuclear program, and now Islamabad will allegedly have to repay this debt - in the form of a finished product.

Note that in 2003, the CIA published data that Pakistan “pulled off” a similar deal with North Korea, exchanging its nuclear technology for North Korean missile technology. This was confirmed by a photograph from an American satellite, which was able to record the process of loading missiles onto a Pakistani Air Force plane near Pyongyang. At the time, Islamabad said it was a “regular purchase” and not an “exchange.”

Pakistan is pursuing a systematic policy to increase its nuclear potential. And this is one of the reasons why he is blocking consideration of the draft fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,” notes Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, former head of the Russian Security Council apparatus, ex-chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces. - Pakistan believes that they have not accumulated a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to ensure their national security.

Indeed, there are estimates that Pakistan produces between 15 and 20 nuclear weapons annually, while its main rival, India, is limited to 5-10. But I don’t believe that this country will become third in terms of nuclear weapons, since many centers incorrectly assess China’s nuclear potential. SIPRI and others count about 300 ammunition in the PRC, but this figure does not correspond to reality - in fact, China has 700-900 of them. In addition, China, in response to the United States deploying a missile defense system, has moved to equipping its ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Accordingly, the number of nuclear weapons will increase significantly.

According to my estimates, Pakistan can in the future reach the level of Great Britain, which officially has 165 deployed warheads, and with those in reserve - 180. Thus, by 2020, Pakistan can really reach the level of 180 ammunition.

“SP”: - American analysts agree with SIPRI and now place Pakistan in sixth place in terms of nuclear weapons in the world. But in 2008, SIPRI reported that Israel had twice as many nuclear weapons as India and Pakistan.

This was a wrong assessment. The nuclear reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Dimona is the only place for the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Israel. Taking into account the fact that they usually always keep a certain amount of nuclear materials in stock, Israel most likely has 80-90 nuclear weapons. He, of course, could modernize the reactor and build more, but I don’t think he needs it.

“SP”: - Pakistan has been accused more than once of trading in nuclear technologies...

Yes, this was revealed in the early 2000s. The head of the country's nuclear program, nicknamed the “father of the Islamic nuclear bomb,” Abdul-Qadir Khan himself later admitted that he traded in nuclear technologies and devices - centrifuges, and transferred them to Iran, Libya and North Korea. After this became known, the Americans intervened and placed the capabilities of the country's nuclear industry under strict control. It is clear that the “black market” has existed for a long time and for a lot of money you can buy anything. But in relation to this area, we can only talk about the sale of technology, but not about the supply, as they say, of the nuclear materials themselves, much less ammunition.

“SP”: - It’s no secret that there are many different extremist groups in Pakistan. At one time there were even publications that they could come to power through legal means...

The military leadership in Pakistan has a strong position and guards strategic facilities. In addition, the United States largely controls Pakistan's nuclear policy. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that radical politicians may come to power in the country, but even if this happens, it is not at all a fact that they will decide to trade or even use nuclear warheads. After all, Pakistan’s existence depends not only on relations with the United States, but also with China, which helps it contain India.

Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin admits that in 10 years Pakistan will be able to surpass Great Britain and France in terms of nuclear weapons.

The British and French are not trying too hard to build up anything. But Pakistan has no chance of overtaking China. All standard estimates of the PRC's nuclear arsenal of 200-300 charges are an absurdity that is even difficult to explain. In addition, India's industrial potential is higher than that of Pakistan, and, of course, Delhi will not allow their main enemy to get ahead like that. This is completely out of the question.

In terms of carriers, it is believed that Pakistan has quite a lot of operational-tactical missiles (OTR Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-1-1A) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles Shaheen-2. . And nuclear charges seem to be adapted to them.

Now regarding the use of Pakistan's nuclear potential by extremists. Even if the Islamists capture a nuclear weapon, they are unlikely to be able to use it. Another thing is that if they come to power in the country, that is, they get the arsenal at their legal disposal, which cannot be ruled out - there is a possibility of this.

Director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia, Semyon Bagdasarov, believes that Pakistan does not have the financial capacity to significantly change its position in the ranking of members of the nuclear club.

In my opinion, this report was made specifically against the backdrop of a possible worsening of relations between Pakistan and India in order to put pressure on Islamabad from the point of view of American interests.

Pakistan is doing well with carriers capable of delivering a nuclear warhead - according to some estimates, the Shaheen-1A missile is capable of hitting a target not only in India and China, but even in Western Europe. But as for the possible nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of extremists, the likelihood of this exists, but not very high yet. Yes, there has been no stability in the country for several decades, but still there are quite strong intelligence services and forces that are so far coping well with the terrorist threat.

Yes, in the north-west of the country - in the so-called tribal zone. The fact is that, historically, the Pakistani authorities have little control over this region. But this is a fairly local area, and its importance should not be greatly exaggerated.

Vladimir Karyakin, a leading researcher at the Regional Security Problems Sector at RISS, Candidate of Military Sciences, draws attention to the paradoxical situation in which countries that have nuclear weapons but have not acceded to the NPT find themselves.

As soon as India and Pakistan - these irreconcilable countries - acquired nuclear weapons, their policy became more cautious and balanced. The parties began to use even conventional weapons less frequently in their own.

Of course, there is always a risk that radical politicians may come to power in eastern countries. But the mechanism for using nuclear weapons is quite complex. As a rule, in order to give a command to launch a missile with a nuclear warhead, three signals must be given simultaneously from different points. That is, the decision to attack is made by consensus.

With regard to nuclear terrorism, even if extremists are able to infiltrate a nuclear program site, they will only be able to obtain certain elements of the weapon. Because with the exception of ICBMs and SLBMs, nuclear warheads are not installed directly on the carrier, but are located in special storage facilities. Assembly requires a special team, for example, from a repair and technical center, whose people know, roughly speaking, how to connect connectors, the procedure for testing the entire unit, etc. In a tactical nuclear charge - an aircraft bomb - there are also a bunch of different fuses and sensors.

So, the threat of terrorists using nuclear weapons is in reality extremely low. Another thing is radiological terrorism, the use of the so-called “dirty bomb”, which involves radiation contamination of objects and territories. Here the risk is significantly higher.

There are many al-Qaeda supporters among young Pakistani officers. One hundred and fifty nuclear warheads may be at the disposal of extremists
http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/exclusive/view/80962/
Our resource publishes the third part of the latest research by Russian political scientist Igor Igorevich Khokhlov, an expert on the problem of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. This is a new study based on materials from 2013; previous parts of the study with data for 2011 were published on our resource two years ago.

During the period when Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure was most intensively built in the 1970s and 1980s, Islamabad's main concerns centered on possible Indian attack. The catalyst for the nuclear program was India's intervention in the internal conflict in East Pakistan, the subsequent defeat in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the formation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Islamabad's main concerns in the aftermath of the 1971 war were the threat of a surprise attack from India: the Indian armed forces, armed with a large number of armored vehicles, could well seize Pakistan's nuclear facilities in a swift attack if they were located close to the extended Indian border. Pakistani border.

Considering this threat, most of the nuclear facilities were built in the north and west of the country around Islamabad and Rawalpindi, in the areas of Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Shilakha, Isa Kel Charma, Torwanah and Tahila, which reduced the risk of sudden destruction or capture of the nuclear arsenal , and also gave additional time to strike in retaliation in the event of a surprise attack. The only exception to this rule is a storage facility for ballistic missiles and possibly their warheads in western Pakistan at Sargodha, west of Lahore. Sargodha is located in a tank-hazardous direction 160 kilometers from the border with India; this territory, which is rocky plains, is an ideal field of action for advancing Indian armored formations.

Over the past forty years, this arrangement of nuclear infrastructure facilities has ensured maximum security for the nuclear arsenal, weapon components, fissile materials, carriers and assembly sites for finished devices: even in the event of a surprise attack by India, the Pakistani armed forces had enough time to deliver nuclear device components to the site assemblies, then install them on the media and apply them.

However, over the past decade the situation has deteriorated significantly: the Bush administration, fully occupied with preparing the invasion of Iraq, greatly underestimated both the Taliban's recruiting base and the organizational abilities of al-Qaeda leaders, as well as Musharaff's desire to help the United States in the fight against the Islamists.

On the one hand, the United States was unable and, perhaps, on the eve of the war against Saddam Hussein, did not want to spend resources on the complete destruction of the Taliban and al-Qaeda supporters: in fact, they were simply squeezed out into Pashtunistan, allowing them to until 2007) to freely restore its infrastructure, recruit new members and conduct propaganda in the territory of both southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. During this time, the Pakistani wing of the Taliban movement emerged, whose goal is to overthrow any regime collaborating with the United States: first they fought against the Musharraf regime, now against the “democratic” government of Asif Ali Zardari.

On the other hand, both the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani military have always considered radical Islamists as an inexhaustible mobilization resource for the war against India in Kashmir, and did not at all want to lose experienced seasoned fighters, many of whom had passed through Kashmir. and Afghanistan. During the most active phase of Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan (OEF-A), the ISI did everything possible to evacuate surrounded militants by air, and those who had broken through to Pashtunistan into Pakistani territory.

The combination of these two factors allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants to recover their strength so quickly after the defeat in the fall-winter of 2001 that already in March 2002 they were able to provide fierce resistance to the troops of the international coalition (International Security Assistance Force - ISAF). During Operation Anaconda (March 1-19, 2002), coalition forces planned to trap al-Qaeda and Taliban militants who had retreated there in the Shahi Kot Valley (Paktia Province, Afghanistan). In fact, the start of the operation was disrupted, American troops suffered serious losses in men and equipment, and only additional aviation forces, which played a decisive role, made it possible to complete hostilities in the valley by March 19, much later than the originally scheduled date. By this time, most of the terrorists managed to safely escape the encirclement and cross into Pakistani territory.

It was in the north of Pakistan that al-Qaeda and the Taliban managed to regain their strength between 2002 and 2007 and begin operations not only in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan itself. It is in these northern regions of the country that the entire nuclear infrastructure built in the 1970s-1980s is located: in fact, almost all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, components for their production, civilian and military facilities where nuclear devices are produced, assembled and stored are in a zone of permanent guerrilla warfare. It is in these regions, located to the west and northwest of Islamabad, that the greatest activity of the Taliban movement is observed and it is where militants of al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other extremist groups are located.

Despite all the physical security measures listed in the first part of the article, nuclear weapons, their components and infrastructure remain extremely vulnerable. The danger comes both from outside - from extremist and terrorist groups, and from within - from individual employees and groups from among the Pakistani military and intelligence officers.

The threat from extremist and terrorist groups, which until now, due to their weakness and fragmentation, have not yet been able to organize a large, well-organized operation, is quite real. Their plans may include seizing the entire nuclear device or all separately stored components for subsequent assembly, or creating a radiological threat by spraying, burning or detonating radioactive materials with sufficiently high radiation intensity. The use of a “dirty bomb” could have catastrophic consequences due to the geographical features of Pakistan: the combination of the northwestern wind rose, which dominates the region, with the location of nuclear facilities in the north-west of the country would allow terrorists to contaminate vast areas of the country with a high population density in a matter of hours without the need to transport radioactive materials. The catastrophic nature of such a scenario is well known from past disasters: for example, the water used by fire crews to extinguish the fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on the morning of April 26, 1986 played a role in the formation of clouds that passed over the European part of the USSR (mainly the western part of the Russian Federation, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR), Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. In the Bryansk region and the territory of the Belarusian USSR, cooled vapors formed into clouds, causing radioactive rain, resulting in damage to both the population and agricultural land, many of which will be unusable for the foreseeable future. A similar scenario is very likely for Pakistan: unlike the use of conventional nuclear weapons, the consequences in this case will be similar to the explosion of a powerful “dirty bomb”, and the main damaging factor may be long-term radioactive contamination of the area. The enormous damage that can be caused to the country's agriculture as a result of the withdrawal of arable land from agricultural circulation will inevitably lead to a shortage of products on the domestic market and to a social explosion.

Extremist and terrorist groups are striving to steadily increase their strength and organization, therefore, as they develop methods of attacking individual garrisons and facilities, the likelihood of a large-scale coordinated attack with the aim of seizing all components of a nuclear device, technical documentation, specialists and, possibly, weapons carriers , most likely, will only increase. Pakistan's current nuclear security system, created in the first decade of the 21st century, was developed on the basis of Western, primarily American standards, in the face of a terrorist threat from certain small and poorly organized extremist groups. Given the growing influence of Salafist and jihadist networks in the border areas of Afghanistan and their strengthening in northwestern Pakistan, it is highly likely that existing security measures will be inadequate to the new nature and scale of the tasks facing them.

Threats of a completely different nature come from individuals and groups within the Pakistani military and intelligence services, both acting in their own interests and collaborating with terrorist groups. It is generally accepted that the Pakistani military, largely from an urban background, represents the most educated and westernized part of society, yet many of them sympathize with radical Islamists.

This kind of solidarity is due to several factors. First, the intelligence and military are actively cooperating with terrorists in Kashmir, have a successful track record of waging a terrorist war with India, and sincerely share the views of Kashmiri militants. The active propaganda work of jihadists in Kashmir since the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was aimed at luring experienced fighters from the Indian to the Soviet front, and since the mid-1990s, al-Qaeda launched a real propaganda campaign in Kashmir, explaining to radical Islamists that their true calling is to fight on the side of the true supporters of the faith - the Taliban - in Afghanistan, and not to serve as cannon fodder for Islamabad in its political games with India. The intelligence officers who constantly collaborate with Kashmiri extremists are imbued with these ideas, as a result of which they are no longer recruiting militants to fight India, but they themselves are being recruited by Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban to fight the “traitors” from Islamabad.

Secondly, young officers who began serving in the armed forces in the 1990s and 2000s are Islamized to a much greater extent than the older generation of military personnel. In English, there is a concept for this phenomenon called “beard count”, based on a play of associations: bearded Islamist militants and radical Iranian revolutionaries of the 1970s; in modern English, this expression means radical Islamists who are ready to overthrow the governments of their own countries during military coups. Currently, the number of "bearded" officers in the Pakistani army and intelligence services has reached a critical mass, which may contribute to the creation of mass organizations of officers acting in concert with terrorists.

Third, Pakistan's military and intelligence officers have been known to collaborate for decades with extremist and terrorist groups fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Taliban.

Currently, a large proportion of Pakistan's military are members of the country's main Islamist party, Jamaat-I-Islami, and many are also linked to extremists through family ties or through "biradari" (a clan group in Pakistani society). .Social relations within the framework of biradari play a huge role in Pakistani society.Unlike a community, its members have neither common property nor joint economic obligations (sharing earnings, paying taxes, etc.); at the heart of biradari is the idea that that the glory or infamy of one member extends to all within a given biradari.Biradari relationships are well captured in a popular Pakistani proverb: “We do not share bread, but we share responsibilities.”In theory, members of a biradari come from the same village, however, in In many regions, the redistribution of land after independence from Britain, urbanization, migration over generations, mass exodus to work abroad, etc. led to the fact that Biradaris members were scattered across different villages, cities and regions. However, the connection in the biradari through the male line is preserved; they retain the preferential right to acquire vacated land, help each other in finding employment, celebrate holidays together, etc.). During the 2000s, intelligence officers and military officers were involved in assassination attempts against Pervez Musharraf, who was the subject of at least seven known assassination attempts.

Also, career officers cooperate with terrorists, both by passing on valuable information to them, providing cover, and by personally participating in terrorist activities. One of the most famous cases is the arrest of the mastermind of the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, known as Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who at the last moment managed to escape arrest in Karachi in September 2002 after he was warned by a sympathetic police officer. Several subsequent attempts to arrest Khalid also ended in failure - he demonstrated amazing awareness, leaving the place of his alleged arrest just minutes before the arrival of operatives. As a result, he was arrested in Rawalpindi only six months later on March 1, 2003, when he was hiding in the house of a high-ranking Pakistani army officer. The motive that made the officer risk his career, life and family safety is simply amazing: being completely removed from politics, he was connected through a biradari with a person whose distant relative is a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami; this distant relative was approached by fellow party members, connected through their bidarari with people who were asked to help with shelter for “one good man” whom they themselves did not really know. It is quite obvious that with such developed social networks, terrorists can reach almost any person in South Asia through biradari, networks of kinship, family and party connections; At the same time, the traditions and obligations existing in society force people completely far from politics to help extremists. In essence, Pakistani society provides terrorists with a ready-made conspiracy network the size of an entire country or even a region.

These examples clearly illustrate the networks of Islamist extremists spread throughout Pakistan and deeply rooted among the military and intelligence officials. Taken together with the stated intention of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear weapons or their components, such connections cannot but inspire concern.

And finally, in their attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, terrorists also rely on civilian specialists, many of whom sympathize with or are members of radical Islamist groups. For example, two leading Pakistani nuclear scientists, Chaudhry Abdul Majeed and Sultan Bashirrudin Mahmood, met numerous times with al-Qaeda operatives and personally with Osama bin Laden in 2000 and 2001, most recently less than two weeks before the events of September 11.

The connections of terrorists with civilian scientific personnel pose no less, and, most likely, a greater danger than their undercover work among the military. If the military has access to the "final product", i.e. to nuclear devices, their components, delivery vehicles, etc., then scientists are the most likely source of uncontrolled leakage of nuclear technology. There is nothing stopping scientists from downloading English scientific material and passing it on to a third party. After the discovery and partial dismantling of the AQ Khan network, most of whose participants remained “unidentified persons,” and the identification of connections between Pakistani scientific and engineering personnel and terrorists, the scale of undercover work carried out by extremists within the scientific establishment became clear. In fact, there is not a single nuclear research and technology center in Pakistan that does not have an active cell of extremists. Any increase in instability within the country, weakening of the ruling regime, or successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan or northern Pakistan could lead to the process of nuclear proliferation becoming irreversible.

David Albright, president of The Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said nuclear leakage from Pakistan is a major US concern: "If instability [continues] to increase, [the authorities] will "There will be much less ability to maintain tight control over the situation. Leaking key information on nuclear issues is typical for Pakistan. This is the nature of the [control] system itself."

I have been asking myself for a long time about Pakistan's nuclear weapons. How did it get there? Have you ever thought? Did anyone counteract this (as the US is now countering Iran) and why little is heard about this, although Bin Laden did entrench himself in Pakistan at one time. I have always been interested in the question, why is India allowed, China is allowed, Pakistan is allowed, but Iran, for example, is not allowed? And then there’s the news today:

Pakistan creates tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in order to increase its potential for means of mass destruction. The Hindustan Times newspaper reported this today with reference to analysts from the American organization Nuclear Information Project.

By developing tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan has practically entered the closed club of countries possessing such weapons, which now includes the United States, Russia, France and China. At the same time, Pakistan, like France, gives tactical nuclear weapons the functions that strategic nuclear weapons perform in Russia and the United States, American experts note. We are talking about the Nasr mobile short-range missile, the first tests of which took place in Pakistan in April 2011.

According to Pakistani open sources, it is designed to destroy objects with great precision at a distance of 60 kv from the launch site. Nasr is a dual-use missile capable of delivering both nuclear warheads and conventional warheads. In Pakistan, it is being created as a “quick reaction weapon for the purpose of nuclear deterrence against sudden threats from a potential enemy.”


According to available official data, the following countries currently possess nuclear weapons: (based on the year of the first nuclear test) USA (since 1945), Russia (originally the Soviet Union, 1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2012). Israel is also considered to have nuclear weapons.

How did the Muslim country Pakistan, which closely cooperates with terrorists, end up in this company? Let's try to find answers to these questions and study the course of history in more detail...

The presence of nuclear forces in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a fundamental moment in the development of world history. This is a completely logical and natural step for a country that, with a rather low standard of living of the population, brings to the fore the priorities of protecting its national sovereignty. The reasons for this programmed phenomenon lie in the very history of the emergence of Pakistan, its current position on the political map of the world. The fact is that the presence in British India, which organically included the modern territories of Pakistan, India and Ceylon, of the largest religious communities - Hindu and Muslim - should sooner or later lead to a political state when each of them would demand complete independence as in public administration, and even more so in representation in the international arena. After the 1857 uprising against the British, who defeated the rebels, the most authoritative leader of the Muslim population of the then unified country was Sayyid Ahmad Shah, who preached Western values ​​and advocated close political and economic ties with England.

The importance of British India for England was so great both strategically and even more so economically that the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, said: “If we lose India, the sun of the British Empire will set.” And in order to prevent all the consequences of such a division in the future, even then a policy of confrontation between religious communities began to be laid down - their internecine war will always distract attention from the foreign policy interests of industrialized countries. That is why, already in 1883, Ahmad Shah managed to implement the rule of separate voting for Muslims and Hindus, and in 1885 a university was founded where only Muslims were admitted. Moreover, it was at his instigation that in 1887 Muslims began to leave the Indian National Congress, which was formed in 1885. After the death of Ahamd Shah in Dhaka in 1906, the All-India Muslim League was formed, which declared its goal to create an exclusively independent Islamic state in India called Pakistan, which translates as “the land of the pure.” However, Mahatma Gandhi appeared on the political scene of British India, who, thanks to his religious tolerance, managed to become the recognized leader of virtually all political forces in the country. But at the same time, personalities such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, who wrote incendiary sermons to fellow believers, managed to almost completely persuade Muslims to create the state of Pakistan.


At the end of December 1930, at the congress of the Muslim League, M. Iqbal spoke in favor of a categorical separation from British India into a completely independent Islamic state. And in March 1940, the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, proclaimed its main goal - the creation of Pakistan. Interesting fact: the name Pakistan was suggested by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali, who lived in England and studied at Cambridge. As we see, the origins of the creation of the new state were educated and literate people who managed to lead millions of backward and unenlightened people. There is a lot to learn from British diplomacy, its politicians and education system. In order to constitutionally legitimize the independence of Muslims in the territorial regions of India, a declaration was adopted in Lahore in 1940, which spoke of “areas in which Muslims constitute a numerical majority. They should unite to constitute independent states in which the territorial units should have autonomy and sovereignty." Then the chronology of events went as follows. On August 15, 1947, at midnight, the independence of India was proclaimed, but already on August 14, the state of Pakistan appeared on the political map of the world. And immediately religious pogroms began, leading to the displacement of millions of refugees. The death toll, according to some sources, exceeded 300 thousand people. And in October 1947, hostilities began between two state formations over the territory of Kashmir, three-quarters of which are Muslim, but power belongs to the leaders of the Hindu community.

Until January 1, 1949, there were bloody battles; the territorial and, especially, religious problems were never resolved. Moreover, even today it does not seem appropriate to talk about a peaceful solution to all disputes between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India. Now it is difficult to even imagine all the consequences that may arise between the two countries in the future. The armed confrontation between the two countries will continue for quite a long time, reminiscent of the situation of the absence of any peace treaty between Israel and Palestine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other. That is why “nuclear potential has become the main force of deterrence and helped establish peace in the region,” said Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. He further states that “in 2002, when India deployed a million-strong army on our borders, ... it was only the fact that Pakistan had nuclear weapons that forced the Indians to abandon plans for an invasion.”

Looking ahead, we note that a completely predictable conflict between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the parties. The war for Kashmir in the future is real, as is the sabotage activity on both sides, which has taken place, is taking place and will take place without time limits. The confrontation is so great that resolving all controversial issues peacefully is very problematic, and that is why such a tough factor as nuclear weapons appears on the scene. As numerous experts have noted, it is almost impossible to estimate the number and types of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal. Everything is surrounded by secrecy and suspicion.

In general, the history of the creation of atomic weapons by Pakistan is a very fascinating description of its effects. According to some experts, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, after the defeat by India in the war for the eastern provinces, on January 24, 1972, gathered leading nuclear physicists. According to American journalist Tim Weiner, Pakistan managed to create a smuggling network that allowed it to steal and buy technology for the production of atomic weapons. However, in reality things were somewhat different. First of all, we should note the participation of mainland China. It was so large that the participation of Saudi Arabia and Libya in this program was purely financial, especially in 1973 and 1974. True, some American journalists believe that the United States is also involved in Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. At least this weapon was created with their tacit consent. Skipping numerous details of the history of the formation of Pakistan's nuclear program, we note that countries such as Holland, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland played a role in the supply of equipment for the enrichment of nuclear ore and the creation of individual components. After Bhutto was overthrown as a result of a coup d'etat and then executed, the creation of nuclear weapons proceeded exclusively under the control of the ISI military intelligence.

Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb in 1998, literally two weeks after India conducted similar tests. Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared itself as a country with nuclear forces, the world community was presented with a fait accompli. This was only possible by the USA, USSR, mainland China and the United States of India, whose atomic component in their weapons is a completely independent structural unit. It is now known that it was Abdul Qadeer Khan who managed to create an atomic bomb for his country at his research laboratory in Kahuta in northern Pakistan. This center operated more than 1,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30-52 nuclear warheads. About two months ago, Pakistan launched an investigation into Abdul Qadir Khan, the country's top nuclear scientist. During the investigation, Khan admitted that he transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The CIA and the IAEA established that he created an entire network for trading nuclear secrets. In early February 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf granted Khan's request for clemency. At the same time, Musharraf said that he would not allow an independent investigation into Khan’s activities and would not open the country’s nuclear facilities to international inspectors. Nuclear explosive devices are believed to be based on a so-called implosion design, which allows the use of a solid core of highly enriched uranium at a cost of approximately 15-20 kilograms per warhead. Let us recall that the solution to the problem of converging spherical shock and detonation waves served as the theoretical basis for the “implosion” principle. It is implosion that makes it possible not only to form a critical mass much faster, but also to make do with a smaller mass of nuclear explosives. Experts explain the participation of mainland China in the creation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan by the following fact.

Seismic measurements of tests conducted on May 28 and 30, 1998 by Islamabad suggest that the results were at levels of 9-12 and 4-6 kilotons, respectively. Since similar designs were used during Chinese tests in the 1960s, it is concluded that Beijing assisted Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the main principle of the presence of Chinese nuclear specialists in the nuclear centers of Pakistan is that the armed clashes between mainland China and the United States of India took on such a local character, the expansion of which could be very costly for both countries. Since the conduct of military operations by Beijing simultaneously against island China and Delhi is a more than dangerous option (in this case, the US Navy will be involved), China’s strategic plan is quite natural, according to which it is planned to create and use Pakistan’s nuclear forces to divert the armed forces India from the border with mainland China and their relocation to the west, to the borders of Pakistan. Moreover, it is Islamabad’s presence of effective nuclear forces that will serve as the basis for strategic security for mainland China. Analyzing the qualitative component of Pakistan's atomic weapons, experts note that there is no accurate data on what type of uranium is used and in what quantity. For two decades, Pakistan has used the gas centrifuge method of uranium enrichment to produce fission material for its own nuclear weapons. Independent nuclear weapons experts estimate that Islamabad has between 24 and 48 nuclear warheads.
Islamabad, comparing itself with countries that possess nuclear weapons, believes that it lags significantly behind them in the field of modernization. Therefore, he is dissatisfied with his first generation weapons and continues to develop other projects in the field of uranium enrichment.

It is believed that the Khushab reactor in Joharabad, in the Punjab region, can produce weapons-grade plutonium. The presence of lithium-6 allows “Pakistani” scientists to obtain tritium. The fact is that next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi there is a processing plant where tritium can be produced. Let us remind you: tritium is used in the thermonuclear reaction of boosting (strengthening) the primary assembly of a nuclear warhead. A thermonuclear charge is a multi-stage explosive device, the power of the explosion is achieved through sequential processes: the explosion of a plutonium charge, and then due to the created reaction temperature - the synthesis of tritium nuclei with the release of even greater energy, which can be used to “ignite” the charge of the third stage of even greater power , etc. The power of an explosive device designed in this way can be arbitrarily large. The traditional method of producing tritium is its production in reactors by irradiating targets from the lithium-6 isotope with neutrons. During warhead storage, tritium losses due to natural decay are approximately 5.5% per year. As tritium decays, it turns into helium. Therefore, tritium undergoes periodic purification from helium.

All these efforts allow Pakistan not only to increase the power of its nuclear forces, but also to begin developing thermonuclear weapons. The acceleration of this process can be attributed to the fact that Pakistan's nuclear committee decided on an adequate response from India to its decision to create a comprehensive nuclear triad: air - land - sea. It was the strengthening of nuclear power that allowed Islamabad to begin its nuclear exports. Thus, in particular, Pakistan is ready to provide military assistance to Nigeria and turn this country into a nuclear power. According to the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, the proposal was made by General Muhammad Aziz Khan, head of the Pakistani Joint Committee of Staff, at a meeting with the Nigerian Minister of Defense in 2004. Khan said that the Pakistani military is developing an entire cooperation program that includes assistance to Nigeria in the nuclear field. It is not specified which weapons, materials or technologies can be transferred within the framework of this program. At the end of January this year, a representative of the Nigerian government announced the preparation of a preliminary agreement with North Korea, under the terms of which Nigeria would receive North Korean missile technology. This report was subsequently denied in Pyongyang, and the spokesman for the Nigerian president said that no agreements had been signed yet. He added that Nigeria is not trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and plans to use missiles exclusively for “peacekeeping” purposes and to protect its own territory. To summarize, we note that Pakistan's scientific research in the field of nuclear weapons has already advanced to the point where it is able to develop thermonuclear weapons. As for Pakistan's nuclear forces, they have real effectiveness and in the event of an armed conflict with India, if a more than unfavorable situation arises in the defense capability of their country, they will be used to the fullest extent.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, simultaneously with the creation of nuclear weapons, planned to use them in various combat conditions and to destroy enemy targets at various distances. Taking into account the solution to these problems, Islamabad also developed various options for means of delivering nuclear warheads - from aircraft to ballistic missiles.

Among the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the F-16 aircraft manufactured in the United States should be considered. Although the Pakistani Air Force will be able to use French Mirage V or Chinese A-5 aircraft in this case. Twenty-eight F-16A (single-seat) and 12 F-16B (two-seat) were delivered between 1983 and 1987. At least eight of them are no longer in service.

In 1985, the US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, aimed at prohibiting Pakistan from building an atomic bomb. Under this amendment, Pakistan could not receive economic and military assistance unless the US President could certify that Islamabad did not possess a nuclear device. This also applied to possible means of delivering nuclear weapons. However, although there was ample evidence indicating that nuclear weapons were being developed in Pakistan, Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. turned a blind eye to this mainly in order to intensify activities against the USSR in the Afghan conflict. After the war in Afghanistan ended, sanctions were finally imposed on Pakistan. This happened on October 6, 1990. In March 2005, George W. Bush agreed to the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. At the first stage, these deliveries included 24 F-16 aircraft.

It should also be noted that, according to Press trust of India, in March 2005, production of the joint Pakistani-Chinese fighter JF-17 officially began in Pakistan. At the aviation enterprise in the city of Kamra, where the aircraft will be produced, a solemn ceremony was held to mark this event. The country's President Pervez Musharraf took part in it.

With the help of Chinese specialists, the F-16 will be modernized for use as a carrier of nuclear weapons. First of all, they will be equipped with squadrons 9 and 11 at the Sargodha airbase, 160 km northwest of Lahore.

The F-16 has a range of more than 1,600 km and can be increased further by upgrading its fuel tanks. Given the weight and payload size limitations of the F-16, the bomb likely weighs approximately 1,000 kg, and it is most likely that the nuclear warhead is suspended in full operational readiness at one or even several Pakistani air bases.

Note that, in principle, assembled nuclear bombs or their components specifically for such aircraft can be stored in an ammunition depot near Sargodha.

Alternatively, nuclear weapons could be stored near the Afghan border. This option is also possible, but for specialists this information is a kind of distraction, because there are clear obligations of the Pakistani authorities to the United States about the non-deployment of nuclear components in the territories adjacent to Afghanistan.

Pakistan's nuclear delivery vehicle is the Ghauri missile, although other missiles in the Pakistani military could be upgraded to carry a nuclear warhead. Ghauri-1 was successfully tested on April 6, 1998, over a distance of 1,100 km, probably with a payload of up to 700 kg. Experts said the missile was launched near the town of Jhelum in northeastern Pakistan, 100 km southeast of Islamabad, and hit its intended target near Quetta in the southwest.

The Ghauri-2 two-stage ballistic missile was tested on April 14, 1999, three days after the Indian Agni-2 missile was tested. The launch was carried out from a mobile launcher at Dina, near Jhelum, and the rocket landed at Jiwani, near the southwest coast, after an eight-minute flight.

A third version of the Ghauri with an unconfirmed range of 2500-3000 km is in development, but was already tested on August 15, 2000.

There is information that there is also a Khataf-V Ghauri missile, the test of which was allegedly carried out in early June 2004. It is said to have a flight range of 1.5 thousand km and can deliver any charge weighing up to 800 kg. The location of the trial was not disclosed. It was as if Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf was present. This was the second test of such a missile in a week(1).

The choice of the name "Ghauri" (2) is very symbolic. The Muslim Sultan Mahammad Ghauri defeated the Hindu ruler Praitvi Chauhan in 1192. Moreover, “Praithvi” is the name that India gave to its short-range ballistic missile.

Using its political intrigue with Beijing against India, Islamabad managed to obtain not just M-11 missiles, but also documentation for their production and maintenance. Since 1992, 30 or more M-11 missiles have been delivered to Pakistan from China. Subsequently, Beijing's assistance also manifested itself in the construction of missile maintenance and storage facilities. Therefore, Pakistan can produce its own Tarmuk missile based on the M-11, which it has done quite successfully.

The war with India is a more than real factor, which is the highest priority of the entire economic and political life of Pakistan. This thought occupied and occupies the heads of the generals of Islamabad, Delhi and Beijing. That is why billions of dollars are spent on the production of already technically developed delivery vehicles and the same amount of money is spent on the creation of new missile systems. In particular, the Chinese M-9 Shaheen-1 (Eagle) missile, redesigned in Pakistan, has a flight range of 700 km and can carry a payload of 1000 kg. Pakistan conducted the initial flight test of the Shaheen from the coastal town of Sonmiani on April 15, 1999.

At the March 23 parade in 2000, Islamabad displayed the Shaheen-2, a two-stage medium-range missile, as well as a missile with a range of 2,500 km capable of carrying a 1,000-kg payload. The missile was transported on a mobile launcher with 16 wheels. It is possible that both missiles could carry nuclear warheads.

In November 2000, Pakistan decided to place its key nuclear institutions under the control of the National Nuclear Weapons Control Committee. The new government, installed in February 2000, set as its goal the creation of an effective nuclear command and control system.

The events of September 11, 2000 served as a reason to strengthen measures against the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Pakistan, as a loyal and more than devoted ally of the United States, immediately strengthened the security of storage facilities with nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

According to press reports, Pakistan's military moved nuclear weapons components to new secret sites within two days of September 11, 2000. General Pervez Musharraf took several active measures to organize the security of maintaining the country's nuclear arsenal. Thus, in particular, six new secret storage and storage facilities for nuclear weapons components were installed.

In early March 2004, Pakistan tested a medium-range ballistic missile that could easily hit any Indian city.

Pakistan's Ministry of Defense said in a statement that the test of the Shaheen-2 two-stage missile was successful. According to Reuters, the creation of Pakistani science and engineering can carry a nuclear warhead at a distance of up to 2,000 km(3). Pakistan said it considered the missile test sufficient to deter aggression and "prevent military pressure."

India was warned about the tests in advance. Let us note that at the beginning of March 2004, India entered into an agreement with Israel to purchase the Falcon airborne radar station. The system can detect aircraft from several kilometers away and intercept radio transmissions over large parts of Pakistan, including the disputed state of Kashmir.

In the first ten days of October 2004, tests of Hatf-5 (Ghauri) medium-range ballistic missiles were carried out, during which all the conditional targets of the alleged enemy were successfully hit.

This rocket runs on liquid fuel and, as some agencies note, was developed based on Korean technology (4). This missile is capable of carrying a nuclear charge and covering a distance of up to 1,500 km.

In April 2006, it was reported that Islamabad had conducted new tests of the Hatf-6 medium-range ballistic missile with an increased range of up to 2,500 km. These tests, according to the Pakistani military, were successful. As noted in one of the reports, “the tests were carried out to confirm a number of additional technical parameters, in addition to those that were verified during the last launch, carried out in March 2005” (5).

conclusions

In Pakistan, the means of delivering nuclear weapons, unlike India, are limited to the air force and missiles, which continue to be improved with the help of China.

In its technical equipment, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has reached full parity with the United States of India and is already ahead of its neighbor in some types of delivery.

The expected evolution of the technical development of Pakistan's rocket industry allows us to conclude that intercontinental ballistic missiles will appear in its arsenal in the very near future.

A.M. Tronov, A.K. Lukoyanov" Pakistan Nuclear Forces"

The presence of nuclear forces in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a fundamental moment in the development of world history. This is a completely logical and natural step for a country that, with a rather low standard of living of the population, brings to the fore the priorities of protecting its national sovereignty. The reasons for this programmed phenomenon lie in the very history of the emergence of Pakistan, its current position on the political map of the world.

The fact is that the presence in British India, which organically included the modern territories of Pakistan, India and Ceylon, of the largest religious communities - Hindu and Muslim - should sooner or later lead to a political state when each of them would demand complete independence both in public administration, and even more so in representation in the international arena.

After the 1857 uprising against the British, who defeated the rebels, the most authoritative leader of the Muslim population of the then unified country was Sayyid Ahmad Shah, who preached Western values ​​and advocated close political and economic ties with England. pakistan nuclear islamic

The importance of British India for England was so great both strategically and even more so economically that the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, said: “If we lose India, the sun of the British Empire will set.” And in order to prevent all the consequences of such a division in the future, even then a policy of confrontation between religious communities began to be laid down - their internecine war will always distract attention from the foreign policy interests of industrialized countries.

That is why, already in 1883, Ahmad Shah managed to implement the rule of separate voting for Muslims and Hindus, and in 1885 a university was founded where only Muslims were admitted. Moreover, it was at his instigation that in 1887 Muslims began to leave the Indian National Congress, which was formed in 1885.

After the death of Ahamd Shah in Dhaka in 1906, the All-India Muslim League was formed, which declared its goal to create an exclusively independent Islamic state in India called Pakistan, which translates as “the land of the pure.”

However, Mahatma Gandhi appeared on the political scene of British India, who, thanks to his religious tolerance, managed to become the recognized leader of virtually all political forces in the country.

But at the same time, personalities such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, who wrote incendiary sermons to fellow believers, managed to almost completely persuade Muslims to create the state of Pakistan. At the end of December 1930, at the congress of the Muslim League, M. Iqbal spoke in favor of a categorical separation from British India into a completely independent Islamic state. And in March 1940, the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, proclaimed its main goal - the creation of Pakistan. Interesting fact: the name Pakistan was suggested by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali, who lived in England and studied at Cambridge.

As we see, the origins of the creation of the new state were educated and literate people who managed to lead millions of backward and unenlightened people. There is a lot to learn from British diplomacy, its politicians and education system.

In order to constitutionally legitimize the independence of Muslims in the territorial regions of India, a declaration was adopted in Lahore in 1940, which spoke of “areas in which Muslims constitute a numerical majority. They should unite to constitute independent states in which the territorial units should have autonomy and sovereignty."

And immediately religious pogroms began, leading to the displacement of millions of refugees. The death toll, according to some sources, exceeded 300 thousand people. And in October 1947, hostilities began between two state formations over the territory of Kashmir, three-quarters of which are Muslim, but power belongs to the leaders of the Hindu community.

Until January 1, 1949, there were bloody battles; the territorial and, especially, religious problems were never resolved. Moreover, even today it does not seem appropriate to talk about a peaceful solution to all disputes between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India. Now it is difficult to even imagine all the consequences that may arise between the two countries in the future.

The armed confrontation between the two countries will continue for quite a long time, reminiscent of the situation of the absence of any peace treaty between Israel and Palestine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other.

That is why “nuclear potential has become the main force of deterrence and helped establish peace in the region,” said Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. He further states that “in 2002, when India deployed a million-strong army on our borders, ... it was only the fact that Pakistan had nuclear weapons that forced the Indians to abandon plans for an invasion.”

Looking ahead, we note that a completely predictable conflict between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of India could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the parties.

The war for Kashmir in the future is real, as is the sabotage activity on both sides, which has taken place, is taking place and will take place without time limits. The confrontation is so great that resolving all controversial issues peacefully is very problematic, and that is why such a tough factor as nuclear weapons appears on the scene.

As numerous experts have noted, it is almost impossible to estimate the number and types of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal. Everything is surrounded by secrecy and suspicion.

In general, the history of the creation of atomic weapons by Pakistan is a very fascinating description of its effects. According to some experts, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, after the defeat by India in the war for the eastern provinces, on January 24, 1972, gathered leading nuclear physicists. According to American journalist Tim Weiner, Pakistan managed to create a smuggling network that allowed it to steal and buy technology for the production of atomic weapons.

However, in reality things were somewhat different. First of all, we should note the participation of mainland China. It was so large that the participation of Saudi Arabia and Libya in this program was purely financial, especially in 1973 and 1974. True, some American journalists believe that the United States is also involved in Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. At least this weapon was created with their tacit consent.

Skipping numerous details of the history of the formation of Pakistan's nuclear program, we note that countries such as Holland, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland played a role in the supply of equipment for the enrichment of nuclear ore and the creation of individual components.

After Bhutto was overthrown as a result of a coup d'etat and then executed, the creation of nuclear weapons proceeded exclusively under the control of the ISI military intelligence. Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb in 1998, literally two weeks after India conducted similar tests.

Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared itself as a country with nuclear forces, the world community was presented with a fait accompli. This was only possible by the USA, USSR, mainland China and the United States of India, whose atomic component in their weapons is a completely independent structural unit.

It is now known that it was Abdul Qadeer Khan who managed to create an atomic bomb for his country at his research laboratory in Kahuta in northern Pakistan. This center operated more than 1,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30-52 nuclear warheads.

About two months ago, an investigation was launched in Pakistan against Abdul Qadir Khan, the country's top nuclear scientist. During the investigation, Khan admitted that he transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The CIA and the IAEA established that he created an entire network for trading nuclear secrets.

In early February 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf granted Khan's request for clemency. At the same time, Musharraf said that he would not allow an independent investigation into Khan’s activities and would not open the country’s nuclear facilities to international inspectors.

Nuclear explosive devices are believed to be based on a so-called implosion design, which allows the use of a solid core of highly enriched uranium at a cost of approximately 15-20 kilograms per warhead.

Let us recall that the solution to the problem of converging spherical shock and detonation waves served as the theoretical basis for the “implosion” principle. It is implosion that makes it possible not only to form a critical mass much faster, but also to make do with a smaller mass of nuclear explosives.

Experts explain the participation of mainland China in the creation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan by the following fact. Seismic measurements of tests conducted on May 28 and 30, 1998 by Islamabad suggest that the results were at levels of 9-12 and 4-6 kilotons, respectively. Since similar designs were used during Chinese tests in the 1960s, it is concluded that Beijing assisted Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the main principle of the presence of Chinese nuclear specialists in the nuclear centers of Pakistan is that the armed clashes between mainland China and the United States of India took on such a local character, the expansion of which could be very costly for both countries.

Since the conduct of military operations by Beijing simultaneously against island China and Delhi is a more than dangerous option (in this case, the US Navy will be involved), China’s strategic plan is quite natural, according to which it is planned to create and use Pakistan’s nuclear forces to divert the armed forces India from the border with mainland China and their relocation to the west, to the borders of Pakistan. Moreover, it is Islamabad’s presence of effective nuclear forces that will serve as the basis for strategic security for mainland China.

Analyzing the qualitative component of Pakistan's atomic weapons, experts note that there is no accurate data on what type of uranium is used and in what quantity. For two decades, Pakistan has used the gas centrifuge method of uranium enrichment to produce fission material for its own nuclear weapons. Independent nuclear weapons experts estimate that Islamabad has between 24 and 48 nuclear warheads.

Islamabad, comparing itself with countries that have nuclear weapons, believes that it lags significantly behind them in the field of modernization. Therefore, he is dissatisfied with his first generation weapons and continues to develop other projects in the field of uranium enrichment. It is believed that the Khushab reactor in Joharabad, in the Punjab region, can produce weapons-grade plutonium.

The presence of lithium-6 allows “Pakistani” scientists to obtain tritium. The fact is that next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi there is a processing plant where tritium can be produced. Let us remind you: tritium is used in the thermonuclear reaction of boosting (strengthening) the primary assembly of a nuclear warhead. A thermonuclear charge is a multi-stage explosive device, the power of the explosion is achieved through sequential processes: the explosion of a plutonium charge, and then due to the created reaction temperature - the synthesis of tritium nuclei with the release of even greater energy, which can be used to “ignite” the charge of the third stage even more power, etc. The power of an explosive device designed in this way can be arbitrarily large.

The traditional method of producing tritium is its production in reactors by irradiating targets from the lithium-6 isotope with neutrons. During warhead storage, tritium losses due to natural decay are approximately 5.5% per year. As tritium decays, it turns into helium. Therefore, tritium undergoes periodic purification from helium.

All these efforts allow Pakistan not only to increase the power of its nuclear forces, but also to begin developing thermonuclear weapons. The acceleration of this process can be attributed to the fact that Pakistan's nuclear committee decided on an adequate response from India to its decision to create a comprehensive nuclear triad: air - land - sea.

It was the strengthening of nuclear power that allowed Islamabad to begin its nuclear exports. Thus, in particular, Pakistan is ready to provide military assistance to Nigeria and turn this country into a nuclear power. According to the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, the proposal was made by General Muhammad Aziz Khan, head of the Pakistani Joint Committee of Staff, at a meeting with the Nigerian Minister of Defense in 2004. Khan said that the Pakistani military is developing an entire cooperation program that includes assistance to Nigeria in the nuclear field. It is not specified which weapons, materials or technologies can be transferred within the framework of this program.

At the end of January this year, a representative of the Nigerian government announced the preparation of a preliminary agreement with North Korea, under the terms of which Nigeria would receive North Korean missile technology. This report was subsequently denied in Pyongyang, and the spokesman for the Nigerian president said that no agreements had been signed yet. He added that Nigeria is not trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and plans to use missiles exclusively for “peacekeeping” purposes and to protect its own territory.

To summarize, we note that Pakistan's scientific research in the field of nuclear weapons has already advanced to the point where it is able to develop thermonuclear weapons. As for Pakistan's nuclear forces, they have real effectiveness and in the event of an armed conflict with India, if a more than unfavorable situation arises in the defense capability of their country, they will be used to the fullest extent.